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1. Introduction
In the last two decades, the economics research frontier has been significantly transformed by the
emergence of a collection of new approaches that criticize traditional neoclassical assumptions,
and whose origins lie largely in other sciences.1 If changes in the research frontier herald future
changes in economics (Davis 2006b), that the new methods and concepts being adopted in
economics come from other sciences strongly suggests that economics will be substantially
different in the future. This invites us to inventory the traditional neoclassical assumptions that
have been the target of these recent critiques, and ask what alternative assumptions are being
proposed as their replacements. Here I focus on one of the most fundamental commitments of
neoclassicism under question, the conception of the individual human being as an economic
agent. The traditional assumption under challenge is that of the human individual as an atomistic
being, Homo economicus. But rather than there being one single alternative conception of the
individual on the agenda in the new work on the research frontier, there are a variety of different
conceptions and elements of conceptions of individuals under investigation as befits the different
origins of the new ideas in economics in different sciences. The task before us, then, is to
distinguish these different conceptions and evaluate their prospects within economics.
Why is the conception of the individual in economics a matter of central importance? First, since
the conception of what an individual is underlies the conception of an economic agent, failure to
adequately articulate the former leads to ambiguity regarding what agents are as well as
regarding how cause‐and‐effect processes operate in economic life. Second, the conception of
the individual economic agent constitutes an ontological anchor for economic analysis, such that
failure to develop an adequate conception of the individual jeopardizes the realism of economic
analysis. Third, on the assumption that economics is about human individuals, having an
adequate conception of the individual is important for the human relevance of economics.
One way to begin is to identify the principal weaknesses of the Homo economicus conception.
Despite its long‐standing appeal, systematic examination of the conception, as I have pursued
using personal identity analysis (Davis 2003b), shows that the conception neither allows us to
individuate human beings in the sense of showing them to be distinct agents, nor allows us to re‐
identify them across change in the sense of showing them to be enduring agents. The first
criterion is synchronic, or oriented toward phenomena considered within limited time frames,
and the second is diachronic, or oriented toward phenomena considered over periods of time.
Note, then, the following three points: First, that the neoclassical Homo economicus conception
satisfies neither criterion means that any alternative conception of the individual can at least
improve upon it by satisfying one of the two criteria without yet being entirely satisfactory in
addressing them both. Second, that the conception of the individual is generally not the primary
focus in the new research programs in economics means that there is often limited sensitivity to
the need to address both synchronic and diachronic dimensions. Third (and most importantly for
what follows), that the new research programs can generally be differentiated according to
whether they emphasize synchronic or diachronic concerns means that they are more disposed to
and more likely successful in making better cases for conceptions of the individual satisfying the
criterion that coheres best with their general orientation.

These points suggest that we should not expect full‐blown, comprehensive conceptions of the
individual to be associated with the new research approaches in economics, but should rather
expect to find a set of arguably incomplete conceptions arranged along a spectrum of synchronic
or diachronic concerns. At the same time, it seems only realistic to suppose that any
reconciliation or integration of potentially quite different strategies for conceptualizing
individuals in the new programs on the research frontier will depend on many other fundamental
concerns regarding the redirection of economics other than how one understands the nature of
individuality. Here, then, my object is to explore the different research programs' possible
“resistances and accommodations” to one another on the subject of how one conceptualizes
individuals (Pickering 1995) in the context of their respective strategies for bringing about
change in the nature of economics. These “resistances and accommodations,” moreover, need to
be seen from the perspective of the outside‐inside dynamic of change on the research frontier
that is driving a process of change in economics generated by science concerns arising outside
economics.
I take the leading postneoclassical research approaches to be classical game theory, evolutionary
game theory, behavioral game theory, evolutionary economics, behavioral economics,
experimental economics, neuroeconomics, and agent‐based computational or complexity
economics. They can be shown to collectively share the idea that human individuals are not
isolated, atomistic beings, but they also differ significantly in how they understand this critique,
according, I will argue, to whether they emphasize synchronic or diachronic frames of
explanation. Indeed, I will argue that those that adopt the former frame lend themselves more to
a microeconomic sort of view, whereas those that adopt the latter frame lend themselves more to
a macroeconomic sort of view. Thus, what mutual accommodation and integration might
transpire between these different approaches is very much a matter of how these broadly
different frames of thinking are re‐organized in economics as a result of the importation of new
science contents from outside economics.
The idea that human individuals are not isolated, atomistic beings can be explained by saying
they are socially embedded (Davis 2003b). This concept has many interpretations, but a basic
Cartesian understanding provides an initial intuition. Descartes is famous for his cogito, ergo
sum proposition. The equivalent proposition for the embedded individual conception is
cogitamus, ergo sum. That is, when individuals act in social contexts, for example, by expressing
themselves in first person plural terms, and thereby (normally) bind themselves to the content of
their shared assertion, they individuate themselves relative to those to whom the assertion
applies. Generally, that is, individuality arises out of relations to others rather than isolation from
others. Thus, at issue in the new approaches in economics is how individuality arises out of
social interaction, or how individual behavior depends upon aggregate behavior.
To organize the discussion that follows in the next three sections, I characterize the Homo
economicus conception in terms of three linked properties that are central to it as an atomist
conception. On the standard view, individuals: (1) have exogenous preferences, (2) interact only
(or almost only) in an indirect manner with one another through the price mechanism, and (3) are
unaffected in these two respects by the aggregate effects of their interaction with one another. As
we will see, the new research programs differ in how objectionable they find each of these
properties, as befits their different commitments to synchronic or diachronic forms of

explanation. Thus, another way to see the issue of mutual accommodation and possible
adjustment of these new programs to one another with respect to their respective
conceptualization of the individual is in terms of the relative significance these three properties
have in the different programs according to their respective emphases on synchronic and
diachronic concerns.
The discussion that follows these three sections then reviews the role of synchronic and
diachronic types of explanations in the possible emergence of a new general research program,
discusses embedded individual microfoundations for that general program, and closes with
speculations regarding the role of thinking about individuals in a future synthesis of the new
research programs.

2. Exogeneity Under Attack
The exogeneity assumption underpins neoclassicism's account of how individuals are distinct
agents in terms of the idea of each necessarily having only his or her own preferences. Aside
from the problematic and circular character of the idea of one's own preferences,2 there are two
related ways in which the exogeneity assumption has been challenged in the recent new
approaches: (1) nonsubjective factors are shown to influence individual preferences via framing
effects, and (2) preferences are seen to reflect the kind of environment the individual or agent
occupies. In both cases, preferences cease to be strictly the agent's own preferences, effectively
becoming socially embedded rather than atomistic. However, the way in which this occurs
differs according to whether the approach is more synchronic (or microeconomic) or more
diachronic (or macroeconomic), and this has implications for the kind of embedded individual
conception developed. I discuss the first case in connection with the rise of behavioral economics
and behavioral game theory and the second case in connection with the rise of one version of
computational economics, namely, agent‐based computational economics.

Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Game Theory
There have long been doubts in and out of economics about the realism of the exogeneity
assumption, but since Maurice Allais's (1953) discovery of common consequence and common
ratio effects at odds with expected utility theory's independence axiom, and subsequent
experimental evidence of preference reversals in the choice of lotteries showing how orderings
depend on preference elicitation procedures (Lichtenstein & Slovic 1971), doubts about
exogeneity have been focused on the independence axiom. The independence axiom states that,
given the choice between two things, an individual's preference for one over the other is
unaffected by the introduction or presence of a third thing. Behavioral economics, particularly as
it has emerged from the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, has made abandonment
of the independence axiom central to a new view of the individual that adds a procedural element
to choice behavior in supposing that individuals rely on a variety of decision heuristics or rules
sensitive to context to frame their choices. Thus, in Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory
(1979), choice is a two‐phase process with prospects “edited” in the first phase using different
decision heuristics, such that choices are then made in the second phase from a restricted or
reformulated class of prospects. This two‐phase analysis makes it possible to look at gains and

losses relative to reference points, and ultimately introduces well‐observed phenomena at odds
with standard framework predictions, such as status quo bias and loss aversion (Tversky &
Kahneman 1992). More generally, prospect theory opens the door to the investigation of a
variety of descriptive and procedure invariance failures that cast doubt on the traditional idea that
individuals possess stable and coherent preferences.
Thus, with this view, preferences are malleable and dependent on the context in which they are
elicited (Camerer & Loewenstein 2003), and choice involves processes whereby individuals
effectively construct their preferences (Payne, Bettman & Johnson 1992; Slovic 1995).
Defenders of the traditional exogeneity assumption, in contrast, have argued for a “discovered
preference hypothesis,” as coined by Charles Plott (1996; also cf. Smith 1989; Harrison 1994;
Binmore 1999), which assumes that individuals have coherent and stable preferences, and though
those preferences are not necessarily immediately revealed in their decisions, they can be
discovered to underlie their apparent preferences, should individuals engage in information
gathering, deliberation, and trial‐and‐error learning. But the case for “discovered preferences” is
by no means a simple one, and in any event has not been persuasive to many who favor a more
empirically based behavioral approach to economics (Cubitt, Starmer & Sugden 2001).
One particularly clear application of these conclusions lies in behavioral game theory research.
In a widely replicated experiment, laboratory subjects engage in a form of interaction called the
ultimatum game, and experimenters test the hypothesis that individuals might act out of a
motivation contrary to their self‐interest, namely, a sense of reciprocity or a desire to respond in
kind to the actions of others, whether for good or bad, depending on the context or institutional
framing of their interaction. The self‐interest postulate is reflective of the exogeneity assumption,
because many neoclassical economists take it to be tautologically true on the belief that
individuals necessarily act on their own preferences. Experimental researchers have found,
however, that laboratory subjects behave consistently or inconsistently with the self‐interest
hypothesis according to context and institutional framing (Fehr & Gächter 2000; cf. Samuelson
2005). This result has been experimentally generalized to a variety of other types of games, such
as the public‐goods game, and has subsequently given rise to a new area of investigation called
social‐utility/social‐preferences research (Camerer & Fehr 2004).
The general conclusion of behavioral research on these subjects is that nonsubjective factors
influence individuals' preferences via various types of framing effects. But while framing reflects
the way the world is presented to an individual, so that the behavioral conception of the
individual is an embedded rather than an atomistic one (and presumably, therefore, one of the
individual as socially embedded), the behavioral treatment of social is so flat and parsimonious
that it includes practically nothing more than the idea that individuals are (or must be) influenced
by other individuals. For contrast, and to anticipate what follows, we might note that any
conception of individuals that takes them through some sort of developmental or evolutionary
process requires a stronger conception of social, because it makes the understanding of the
individual depend on changing interaction with others, which expands the idea of social to
include social structure. But although some behavioral experiments involve repeated play, the
experimental set‐up lacks the degree of structural detail in the agent‐based approach to
computational economics.

Agent‐based Computational Economics and Complexity
Accounts
To understand the nature of social embedding in agent‐based approaches to computational
economics (agent‐based computational economics or ACE), we need to first distinguish an
earlier version of computational thinking in economics that has grown out of neoclassical
economics, which, in a quite opposite manner, disembeds cognition from individuals. This more
traditional form of computational economics derives from postwar artificial intelligence (AI)
theory, now known as classical AI. Classical AI, in contrast to later connectionist and neural
network AI theory, treats cognition as any (serial) symbol‐processing activity understandable in
computational terms. Drawing on the computation concept of a Turing machine,3 Noam
Chomsky's generative grammar idea,4 and the view that the brain itself is merely a computing
device,5 classical AI is functionalist in supposing that cognition may be equated with any and all
computations made possible by a given set of functional operations. As functional operations are
by nature immaterial, they can, accordingly, be realized or instantiated in a variety of different
physical forms. This “multiple realizability thesis” implies that cognition need not be exclusively
associated with human beings (or any other particular kind of entity), and thus provided a basis
for early AI theory, at least in the weak AI version that seeks to locate cognition in nonhuman
physical forms, without supposing they replicate human intelligence.
This early view is adopted in postwar formalist neoclassicism, which, although not explicitly
termed a computational economics nonetheless was functionalist in character, gave rise to
computational general equilibrium theorizing.6 Thus the optimization algorithms generated in the
development of the Arrow‐Debreu‐McKenzie axiomatic general equilibrium rational choice
models (and later rational expectations models), though originally thought to reflect human
reasoning, came to be seen as purely functional in nature, leading to their “disembedding” from
human individuals, and instantiation in any number of other types of agents.7 In this economics
version of the multiple‐realizability thesis, then, preferences have no special relation to human
beings, and accordingly are neither no longer subjective phenomena, nor serviceable for uniquely
distinguishing human individuals, since any imaginable agent— human or nonhuman, individual
or group, subpersonal agent or whole agent— could be said to have preferences as defined by
that agent's objective function.
For a number of reasons, however, doubts developed about classical AI's functionalist
commitment. Particularly influential was John Searle's (1980) Chinese room argument, which
concluded that symbol manipulation lacked meaning without a concept of understanding, or that
syntax does not suffice for semantics.8 Semantics concerns the nature of meaning, and since
meaning is always intentional, it presupposes a vantage point from which things take on an
“aspectual shape” (Searle 1992, 157). But this meant for Searle that the functionalist
disembedding of the mind from the brain is incoherent, because it identified cognition with
immaterial operations.
Much of later AI has followed this lead, and assumed that some system of symbol grounding is
needed to explain cognition, and that symbol systems are “grounded‐up” in nonsymbolic systems
(Harnad 1987, 1990). The sort of view this involves— generally termed connectionism, and

developed in terms of neural networks and parallel distributed processing— is that cognition is
not simply symbol manipulation, but rather involves a nonsymbolic/symbolic dynamic process
operating on a multilevel basis. The idea that cognition is “grounded‐up” has also been expressed
as “bottom‐up design” and “situatedness” (Brooks 2002). Essentially the idea is that cognition
depends on sensory classification systems, which cannot be separated from an entity's place in
the world.
In economics, then, though the use of computational methods for solving the Arrow‐Debreu‐
McKenzie axiomatic general equilibrium models continues the early AI functionalist tradition
(cf. Amman et al. 1996), an ACE has subsequently also emerged” which explicitly employs a
bottom‐up type of analysis that models agents in specific environments (cf. Tesfatsion & Judd,
2006).9 That is, ACE modeling captures the “ground‐up” idea of connectionist AI by adopting a
“culture‐dish” approach to the study of economies seen as complex adaptive systems. The
modeler computationally constructs an economic world comprising multiple interacting agents,
where each agent is “an encapsulated piece of software that includes data [about the agent]
together with behavioral methods that act on these data,” and where agents are both economic
agents and represent other social and environmental phenomena (Tesfatsion 2006). After
specifying an initial state of the economic system, the economy is allowed to evolve to simulate
the dynamics of real‐world systems.
Individual behavior, then, is seen to not only reflect the kind of environment the individual or
agent occupies, but also to undergo adaptation as changes in that environment feedback to the
individual. For example, in Leigh Tesfatsion's simulation model of the labor market, a small
number of work suppliers and employers of different types repeatedly interact, each keeps
“separate track of his interaction with each potential worksite partner,” and continuously updates
his or her behavioral rules for different worksites based on what is remembered about past
payoffs in past interactions (Tesfatsion 2001, 9). The analysis embeds individuals in a social
structure, defined in terms of an array of possible labor market interactions, and generates a
dynamic account of the behavior of individuals and social structure in which each acts upon the
other. This contrasts with the more modest social embedding of individuals in behavioral
economics research, where these reciprocal effects are largely absent. The difference may partly
be explained in terms of the different methods of investigation— experiment vs. simulation—
with the former lending itself more to synchronic analysis and the latter lending itself more to
diachronic analysis. But there is also a difference in terms of the way that the social is built‐in to
the ACE approach. Behavioral economics essentially asks where and how the atomistic
conception of the individual breaks down, whereas the ACE approach begins with a situated
agent, and never so much as entertains the old atomistic conception.

3. Interaction Revisited
The standard view is that individuals interact only (or almost only10) indirectly with one another
through the price mechanism. Classical game theory, of course, originates in the rejection of this
assumption. Individuals are interdependent in the sense that they know (or have beliefs about)
each other's utility functions, know the rules of the games they play with each other, and have
common knowledge of this.11 They are thus able to take the actions of others into account in

making their own decisions, rather than simply responding to price signals. Within this
framework there is a wide range of accounts of interdependence and its effects that socially
embed individuals in games, though they generally share the restriction that individuals'
preferences remain exogenous, and assume that individuals employ traditional expected utility
reasoning. Evolutionary game theory, in contrast, puts both exogeneity and standard rationality
theory to the test by explaining individual strategies as best responses to selection pressures, such
that individuals are effectively only the bearers of strategies that are themselves in competition.
Interaction in dynamic game‐theoretic contexts thus further embeds individuals, indeed so such
so that they arguably lose their status as economic agents. Finally, ACE network theories offer
yet a third view of interaction between individuals by supposing that individuals interact both
directly and indirectly with other individuals in structures of interaction.

Classical Game Theory
Here I focus on the contribution of John Harsanyi in light of his explicit elaboration of an
alternative conception of the individual as being of a certain type (cf. Davis 2003a). Harsanyi
proceeds by adopting two stratagems required to make use of the Nash equilibria framework.
First, he argues that games of incomplete information should be treated as a new kind of game of
complete information: “the new game G* will be one with complete information because its
basic mathematical structure will be defined by the probabilistic model for the game, which will
be fully known to both players” (Harsanyi 1995, 295). Second, though he assumes that players
employ pure strategies (since this seems more plausible than randomization), they appear to
other players to be using mixed strategies if we suppose these apparent mixed strategies are other
players' best guesses or conjectures about which pure strategy a player is playing (Harsanyi
1967/1968). He then argues that although a complete information game (or C‐game) is always
analyzed on the assumption that “the centers of activity” are particular individuals, incomplete
information games (or I‐games) are more clearly formulated as having types of players as their
“centers of activity” (Harsanyi 1995, 295).
With this conception, facts about players not known to all players are replaced by probability
assessments regarding players' characteristics that are known to all players. Players are
represented as types because they may be represented in terms of certain sets of characteristics.
Broadly speaking, they may be represented as being certain types, because of “causal factors” or
“social forces” in the world that determine what characteristics different individuals are likely to
possess (Harsanyi 1995, p. 297).12 Harsanyi also assumes that players know which type they
themselves each represent— “know their own identities” (296)— and rely on this information to
assess the probability that other players are of certain types. This makes each player's assessment
that another player is of a certain type a conditional probability assessment, one conditional, that
is, on knowing one's own type. All players make such assessments and, consequently, any given
player (player 1) will act “so as to protect his interests not only against his unknown actual
opponent… but … against all M types of player 2 because, for all he knows, any of them could
now be his opponent in the game” (299). Thus, each player's expected payoff depends not just on
the strategy of the actual unknown opponent, but also on the strategies of any one of M potential
opponents.13 Then, regarding types of players as “the real ‘players’ ” and their payoff functions
as the “real payoff functions, one can easily define the Nash equilibrium… of this C‐game G*”
(300).

Harsanyi's intention to treat individuals as being of certain types involves a significant departure
from the standard arm's‐length, indirect‐interaction view.14 His “as if” complete information
games not only knits individuals together in the pattern of their choices; it also gives them full
accounts of one another, if in a probabilistic sense, in contrast to neoclassicism's assumption of
them being inaccessibly subjective about one another. Consequently individuals are socially
embedded in the games they play with one another in that their individuality depends on their
interaction, in this instance in being recognized as individual types by one another. Despite this,
classical game theory retains the standard exogeneity assumption, since interaction never
changes individuals' payoff functions. This further step is undertaken in evolutionary game
theory.

Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) arose out the application of the theory of games to biological
contexts, and the development of the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (Maynard
Smith & Price 1973; Maynard Smith 1982). It took on direct economic application in Robert
Axelrod's investigation of cooperation (Axelrod 1984), and gained a larger following in
economics as a result of disenchantment with the equilibrium refinements project of classical
game theory. The central assumption is that players adapt their behaviors in terms of the
strategies they play over the course of repeated games. Payoffs represent fitness in some
selection process that players achieve by adapting their strategies to the dynamics of competition.
Interaction is, thus, both game theoretic and subject to evolutionary forces.
One of the more interesting aspects of EGT is its ambiguity regarding how the players of games
are to be understood (cf. Ross, 2005, 194ff). If we see EGT as simply an extension of classical
game theory, payers are the human individuals whose choices reflect beliefs about which
strategies are the best replies to the strategies of others. But if we suppose that the selection
process determines which strategies produce fitness, strategies themselves are the players, and
individuals “are simply passive vehicles for these strategies, coming to play their brief hands and
then dying off to be replaced by others who inherit their dispositions with modifications induced
by mutation and, at the population level, by selection” (Ross 2005, 198; also cf. Sugden 2001).15
Thus, if in classical game theory, individuals are socially embedded in the games they play, EGT
(arguably so) further embeds them in the dynamics of interaction so as to remove them as agents
from the game altogether. That is, EGT effectively turns the standard exogeneity assumption on
its head by making particular individuals irrelevant to selection. Here we find an especially clear
difference between classical game theory's synchronic perspective and EGT's diachronic
perspective.

ACE Network Theories
Network theory originates in mathematics and graph theory, and today is part of the study of
complex systems and nonlinear dynamics. The analysis and study of networks exists in virtually
every science (Strogatz 2001), and is an important foundation of ACE. Networks are structures
made up of nodes, which can be individuals or groups of individuals, and the links or ties

between them, which can vary in strength. In the case of economic networks, individuals can
thus be said to have both strong ties to some individuals (interact directly) and weak ties to other
individuals (interact only indirectly), such as in models of oligopoly firms surrounded by a
competitive fringe. Alan Kirman has argued that assuming individuals interact in both ways
represents an advance over both general equilibrium theory and game theory, which each assume
that individuals interact in only one way— indirectly in the former and directly in the latter—
associating this with the Sonnenschein‐Mantel‐Debreu problems of the former and the
equilibrium selection problems of the latter (Kirman 1997; also cf. Rizvi 1994; Davis 2006a).
Tesfatsion sees the need to combine direct and indirect interaction in models of markets as an
implication of abandoning the artificial Walrasian auctioneer construct in explaining real world
interaction between individuals (Tesfatsion 2006).
Distinguishing different kinds of ties and seeing them as interconnected in some way introduces
structure into the analysis of individual interaction. Tesfatsion (2001), for example, develops a
model of labor markets in which work suppliers and employers interact repeatedly at different
kinds of worksites in prisoner's dilemma games. Thus individuals are not only embedded in
games with other individuals, but are also embedded in games that are themselves embedded in a
social structure. Whereas game theory explains the emergence of social structures in the form of
norms and conventions, ACE network theory presupposes such structures in the analysis of
games. Indeed, ACE network theory begins with a liberal view of the population of agents,
including among them, “individuals (e.g., consumers, workers), social groupings (e.g., families,
firms, government agencies), institutions (e.g., markets, regulatory systems), biological entities
(e.g., crops livestock, forests), and physical entities (e.g., infrastructure, weather, and
geographical regions)” (Tesfatsion 2006, 6). This larger cast of agents represents an even further
departure from the standard view of interaction than one finds in neoclassicism.

4. Aggregate Behavior and Feedback
On the standard view, the relationship of individual behavior to aggregate behavior is
unidirectional. Aggregate behavior has individual behavior as its basis, and feedback effects
from aggregate behavior to individual behavior are assumed to be absent. Individuals' choice sets
are parameterized by aggregate outcomes, but individual preferences remain unaffected and
insulated from changes at the aggregate level. One well‐known expression of this is the New
Classical Macroeconomics microfoundations research program that aims at unifying
microeconomics and macroeconomics by aggregating up to macroeconomic relationships strictly
in terms of preferences, endowments, and technology. Here I review three challenges to this
general view from behavioral game theory, neuroeconomics, and evolutionary economics/ACE
complexity thinking. In different ways, all embed individuals in social economic frameworks by
allowing for aggregate level feedback effects, which affect individual behavior.

Behavioral Game Theory
Behavioral game theory departs from classical game theory's rationality focus by applying
experimental results from cognitive psychology to the study of individuals' strategic interaction
in games (Camerer 2003). By creating complete, self‐contained economies in the laboratory

made up of agents and institutions, researchers are able to generate experimental data that allow
them to test a variety of standard theory assumptions.16 The kinds of games generally given the
most attention are those that exhibit cooperative dilemmas with free rider problems such as the
public‐goods game (Fehr & Gächter 2000). The general problem encountered in these games is
an equilibrium selection problem in that free‐riding equilibria and cooperative equilibria can both
exist according to the kinds of institutions (or instructions for experimental subjects) in place.17
In one recent examination of this problem designed to explain the effect of different institutions
on individual behavior (Gürerk et al. 2006), an experiment was devised in which players
repeatedly choose between two different institutions: one in which individuals chose a level of
contribution to a public good, which was then augmented by the experimenter and divided
among players, and a second in which the same arrangement applied, but there was also an
opportunity for individuals to punish free riders. In initial rounds of the game, free riding
prevailed in the no‐punishment setup, leading to low payoffs, whereas free riding was punished
in the setup in which this was available, leading to higher payoffs. But with repeated play,
individuals migrated from the low‐ to the high‐payoff game with the punishment institution.
What the experiment was interpreted to demonstrate was that individuals change their behavior
in light of their appraisal of aggregate outcomes.18 That is, individuals adopt one set of decision
rules at the outset, observe their consequences in the aggregate, and then revise their decision
rules in light of their observations. This in turn affects the character of overall aggregate behavior
by virtue of the increased share of individuals participating in the punishment institution,
suggesting that individual and aggregate behavior continuously interact in a cycle of mutual
effects on one another. In contrast, in the standard (nonexperimental) framework, such feedback
mechanisms do not operate in that rational individuals are always predicted to choose the free‐
riding institution.

Neuroeconomics
Neuroeconomics can be seen as an extension of behavioral economics' cognitive science‐based
revision of standard expected utility reasoning through use of neuroscience imaging techniques
to more securely ground observed behavioral propensities in neurological phenomena, and thus
as a strategy for making incremental changes in standard theorizing. It may also be seen as
offering an alternative framework in the form of an altogether different set of theoretical
constructs to explain behavior, and thus as a strategy for making radical departures from standard
theorizing (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec 2005). In the more radical approach, cognitive
decision making is thought to employ both deliberative and automatic processes, and cognition
and emotion are thought to both contribute to behavior. Taking these two dimensions together
gives four possible combinations of neural functioning that can be employed to categorize kinds
of human behavior that may operate in parallel, separately (seen as specialization), and in
coordination. This implies that individuals are capable of a variety of different possible
behaviors, whereas, in contrast, standard theory only allows for behavior explained exclusively
in terms of expected utility maximizing.
One way of seeing the neural basis for human behavior, then, is to say that human intelligence is
modularized or highly domain (or neuron) specific. This in turn implies that environmental

triggers can call forth different types of neural activity. For example, in regard to time‐
preference, whereas standard theory assumes the same degree of time‐preference for all
intertemporal trade‐offs, it can be argued that different contexts elicit different degrees of time‐
preference according to the deliberative, automatic, cognitive, and affective aspects of the neural
processing involved. At the same time, neuroscience research does not support the conclusion
that particular types of behavior are always associated with the same brain modules. Brain injury
research shows a relatively high degree of plasticity or the ability of the brain to shift functions
from one domain to another that has not been impaired. But the shifting of functions can also
occur under normal circumstances, such as those associated with learning and experience. Thus
reinforcement learning in normal form games has been explained as combining rapid emotional
processing— reflecting sense of gain or loss— and a slower deliberative processing— reflecting
grasp of counterfactuals (Camerer and Ho 1999).
What emerges from this are views of the brain, behavior, and the environment that involve
response and adjustment in a complex array of different possible forms. It would thus be a
mistake to say that neuroeconomics research follows the standard model's understanding of the
relation of individual behavior to aggregate behavior.19 Rather, while aggregate behavior is a
product of individual behavior across many individuals, aggregate behavior also exercises
feedback effects on individual behavior that it can, in principle, be traced to changes in
individual neural functioning. Like behavioral economics and game theory research, much of
neuroeconomics research employs laboratory experiments in which experimental subjects play
repeated games during brain imaging. Repeated games allow researchers to track changes in
behavior associated with experimental subjects' experience across games. Accordingly neuro‐
imaging offers the opportunity to replicate results arrived at in pure behavioral experiments, such
as the choice‐of‐institutions game discussed in the previous section. The evidence produced thus
far suggests that both sets of investigations support one another, and, therefore, that individual
and aggregate behaviors have mutual effects on each other.

Evolutionary Economics/ACE Complexity Thinking
I combine these two different research programs here because they reach very similar
conclusions with respect to the issue of individual and aggregate behavior. Indeed, though the
two programs have two separate sets of origins, they overlap on a number of counts that arguably
reflect their shared diachronic orientations. Evolutionary economics is a research program
concerned with the evolutionary analysis of long‐run change that derives from evolutionary
theory in biology and sociobiology, and efforts to extend and modify this form of analysis in
connection with human social behavior and social‐cultural evolutionary processes (Nelson 1995;
Vromen 1995).20 ACE/complexity thinking has similar origins, but adds an emphasis on the
mathematics of nonlinear dynamic systems and simulation models as compared to evolutionary
economics' preference for theorizing based on empirical research. Both assume that evolutionary
theorizing rejects accounts of economic change that employ “mechanical analogies” (Nelson
1995, 53).
Evolutionary economics approaches in particular develop arguments about systems that are
subject to processes of random variation but also exhibit selection processes that winnow those
variations. Evolutionary systems consequently show both strong inertial tendencies working to

preserve what survives selection and also continuous change as the introduction of new variety
through random mutation modifies those systems. Thus behavior of a system in the aggregate is
continuously affected by the behavior of its changing elements, which in turn are affected by the
selection behavior of the system.
ACE/complexity thinking similarly emphasizes dynamic interaction between a system's elements
and its structure. The behavior a system's elements exhibit produces aggregate patterns or
structures in the system. Because this structure is emergent, the behavior of the system's
elements then adapts to it. The system's structures are then further changed, the elements further
adapt, and so on in a continuous process of change through time. A class example is W. Brian
Arthur's El Farol bar problem (Arthur 1994). One hundred people independently decide whether
to show up at the El Farol bar. If many predict the bar will be crowded, the bar ends up being
empty. But should the bar be empty, they revise their prediction, then expecting it to be empty,
and all go, but it ends up being crowded, leading them to then predict the bar will be crowded,
and so on. Predictions thus depend on predictions, and no correct expectations model is
available. In contrast, in rational expectations models, agents somehow know in advance what
model is correct (and everyone knows that everyone knows this is the correct model), so that
aggregate behavior is fully known in advance, and agents need never revise their behavior.

5. Synchronic and Diachronic Forms of
Explanation
All the research programs reviewed earlier, then, adopt elements of an embedded individual
conception, but, as should now be clear, they do so in quite different ways according to the
different types of objections they make to the standard conception. To make the nature of that
conception and its critique clear, these objections were organized according to which of its three
(linked) properties they target: preference exogeneity, indirect interaction, and absence of
feedback effects from aggregate to individual behavior. But under each objection I have also
provided discussions of approaches that reflect either more synchronic or more diachronic
concerns in order to emphasize the deeper differences between these approaches. In the
discussion in this section, I further pursue these differences to examine what types of
contributions they make to a general conception of the individual as an embedded agent.
As noted at the outset, conceptions of the individual can be evaluated according to two criteria
needed to explain the (personal) identity of the individual (Davis 2003b). The individuation
criterion requires that a conception of the individual show how individuals are distinct and
independent from one another. Individuation is largely a synchronic concern. The re‐
identification criterion requires that a conception of the individual show how individuals can be
shown to be the same separate entities across a process in which some or even many of their
characteristics change. Re‐identification is largely a diachronic concern. Note also, however, that
neither framework is particularly well suited to addressing the other framework's natural focus.
Because synchronic forms of explanation largely bracket through‐time or through‐process
considerations to focus on the character of an entity or mechanism, they do not really address
whether individuals are re‐identifiable through change. Because diachronic forms of explanation

emphasize change and process, they tend to ignore the status and individual credentials of
particular entities. This suggests that the conceptions (or elements of conceptions) of the
individual we find in the new research programs— to the extent that they offer essentially
synchronic or diachronic forms of explanation— are likely to be incomplete, and that a complete
conception of the individual satisfying both criteria will need to combine elements of both
synchronic and diachronic research programs. Because the research programs with the more
synchronic orientation are more “micro” in nature, and the research programs with the more
diachronic orientation are more “macro” in nature, this further suggests that an adequate
embedded individual conception, as might emerge from some combination of the new research
programs in economics, needs to combine both micro and macro aspects.21
The research programs with synchronic forms of explanation, then, are classical game theory,
behavioral economics, behavioral game theory, and neuroeconomics. Should these research
programs move toward synthesis in the future or be increasingly accommodated to one another
in Pickering's terms, then it seems reasonable to suppose that the rationality assumptions of
classical game theory are most likely to be given up (or significantly modified), because they are
contested in one way or another by all the remaining programs in this group. At the same time,
that game theory has become central to behavioral, experimental, and neuroeconomics research
suggests that it is likely to remain essential to synchronic forms of investigation. We might
consequently label this synthesis experimental game theory, where this encompasses
complimentary behavioral and neuroeconomics strategies.
The research programs with diachronic forms of explanation are EGT, evolutionary economics,
and ACE/complexity economics. Here there are arguably greater barriers to mutual
accommodation and synthesis by virtue of there being two quite different views of individual
agents. On the one hand, EGT and evolutionary economics both subsume individual agents in
evolutionary processes. With the more radical view of EGT, strategies are players, and individual
agents “are simply passive vehicles for these strategies” (Ross 2005, 198), while in evolutionary
economics individuals need not be human individuals and need not survive in any particular
form through a given evolutionary process. On the other hand, ACE/complexity approaches, as
ground‐up, agent‐based forms of investigation, presuppose individual agents (human and
otherwise), and investigate how these particular agents adapt to dynamic processes. We might
distinguish these two opposed kinds of views as evolutionary‐process and evolutionary‐agent
strategies. Accommodation of these strategies to one another does not seem possible within the
boundaries of the programs as they are currently pursued.
There accordingly seem to be two quite different possible future pathways available for the new
research programs taken as a whole. If synchronic and diachronic forms of explanation are
integrated, and micro and macro approaches are developed together in a shared framework, then
the reconceptualization of individuals in an experimental game theory could be linked up with
the evolutionary‐agent approach in ACE/complexity accounts, because both frameworks
emphasize individual agents. Alternatively, should evolutionary‐process accounts prevail,
synchronic and diachronic forms of explanation in the new research programs would likely not
link up, thus tending to reproduce the current division between micro and macro in terms of two
research programs largely opposed to one another on the place and significance of individuals in
economic explanation.

One motivation for the first scenario is a preference for a unity of science view. But
philosophers' and scientists' preferences may be irrelevant when it comes to how economics
actually develops. A second, perhaps stronger motivation is grounded in the availability of
critique. That is, when micro and macro explanations are not reconciled, proponents of each may
argue for the reduction of the other to their own framework. This is the basis of neoclassical
microfoundations reasoning, where the critique advanced is that the macro must ultimately be
understood in terms of the decisions of individuals.22 In the following section, however, I outline
another microfoundations critique for a pathway the new research programs might take that
favors the combination of experimental game theory and the evolutionary‐agent approach. The
difference between this argument and the standard microfoundations argument is that, whereas
the latter as based on the atomist conception of the individual and is reductionist, the former
argument, as based on an embedded individual conception, is not reductionist, and thereby has
an appeal the standard view lacks.

6. Embedded Individual Microfoundations
The standard case for microfoundations involves a transcendental argument that supposes
macroeconomic relationships must be explainable in terms of the behavior of individuals. As
individuals exist, and as macroeconomic relationships are aggregative and do not make reference
to individuals, they must somehow be “reduced to” or re‐interpreted in terms of individual
behavior. At root in the argument, however, is the idea that individual behavior and aggregate
behavior cannot be combined in a single representation, thus requiring one or the other. Should
this view be given up, and individual behavior and aggregate behavior be seen as somehow
related, the traditional reductionist project ceases to have meaning. This alternative view
naturally finds support in embedded individual conceptions, which, by definition, combine
individual and aggregate behavior. Thus, embedded individual conceptions short‐circuit
reductionism. At the same time, if individual behavior and aggregate behavior are represented as
related and mutually determining, explanations of aggregate behavior that exclude explanations
of individual behavior, such as arguably is the case in the evolutionary‐process approach, make
the same mistake as traditional microfoundations arguments, and are at best incomplete. An
embedded individual microfoundations would accordingly incorporate an evolutionary‐agent
approach.
But how would such a view provide microfoundations were the project not reductionist?
Essentially an embedded individual microfoundations project constitutes a focus of analysis
rather than an interpretive substrate. Individuals remain a central concern (for the reasons set
forth at the outset), but their investigation (also transcendentally) presupposes and
simultaneously requires examination of the aggregative relationships they occupy. This type of
investigation clearly demands attention to a balance between individuals' embeddedness and
independence that is not needed in atomistic individual microfoundations arguments, which
assume individuals to be always independent. This type of investigation also demands attention
to whether embedded individuals are sustainably independent, because if they are not, they could
arguably be said to drop out of our explanations, as in evolutionary‐process approaches.

Here I do not attempt to set out such an explanation, since this task must presuppose the
elaboration of particular substantive arguments about how the synchronic and diachronic
research programs discussed earlier might be synthesized. But such an explanation, I suggest,
can proceed in terms of two criteria, that is, by evaluating proposed individual conceptions
according to whether they allow us to individuate and re‐identify the economic agents they
assume. Satisfying the re‐identification criterion, it should be added, likely constitutes the more
difficult task, since there is a clear debate in diachronic research programs regarding whether
individuals are passive placeholders in evolutionary processes. Further, significant difficulties
confront evolutionary‐agent approaches regarding individual re‐identification across change,
because it is not clear how individuals' adaptations to changing social structures are compatible
with their re‐identification as self‐same individuals.23 Indeed, then, which of the two broad
scenarios for the future of economics as it develops out of the new research programs
transpires— a single unified program or reproduction of the division between micro and
macro— depends on these issues.

7. Concluding Speculations
It was noted earlier that the new research programs in economics have hardly made the
conception of the individual their chief concern. Thus, their development is likely to be driven by
other factors, and their adoption of particular conceptions of the individual to be more a by‐
product of other considerations. At the same time, most of the new research approaches in
economics work implicitly with new conceptions of the individual, ones that I have argued all
depart from the standard atomistic conception. This by itself may cause more attention to be paid
to those conceptions, since it would seem ultimately to be bound to become clear to most
practitioners that they are working with conceptions of the individual at odds with the conception
that has been a pre‐eminent marker of economics for over a century. Indeed, the standard view of
the individual has long had more than scientific significance, since it is also one fixed in the
popular understanding of economics, both on account of the way economics has long represented
itself as a science of individual choice, and because economic micropolicy, which impacts the
world, is formulated in terms of individuals. Moreover, already a vigorous debate over the
implications of thinking about individuals as less than rational— because of (embedding)
framing effects— has surfaced in regard to the discussion of paternalism vis‐à‐vis free market
prescriptions (Camerer & Loewenstein 2003).
It might also be argued that it is in the nature of a transition from one dominant approach
(neoclassicism) to another— where this specifically involves the import of other science
technologies— that a kind of interregnum period is likely to prevail when technical questions are
foremost in economists' effort to assimilate new methods.24 Yet when method stabilizes, the trees
slide into the background to reveal the shape of the forest. Then arguably the perennial questions
re‐emerge for philosophers regarding individuals, markets, and value.
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Notes:
(1.) Thanks without implication go to Fredrik Hansen, Floris Heukelom, Harro Maas, Abu Rizvi,
and Leigh Tesfatsion, and the members of the workshop.
(2.) I argue in Davis (2003b) that this conception of the individual as a distinct being is circular
in that the individual is picked out in terms of the idea of ‘own’ preferences. The conception
allows that two individuals could have identical preferences, but would still be distinct

individuals by virtue of those preferences belonging separately to each. The concept of belonging
presupposes that which is to be picked out.
(3.) For more on Alan Turing, see Mirowski (2002).
(4.) Noam Chomsky (1955 [1975]; 1965) held that language capacity involves information
processing that relies on a “deep” generative grammar that could be understood as syntactic
symbol manipulation, an elementary form of which would employ Boolean algebra.
(5.) Warren McCulloch, a physiologist, and Walter Pitts, a logician, supposed that the human
nervous system could be understood as universal computing device. In their seminal 1943 paper,
“A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity,” they showed that
configurations of neurons could perform any calculations computable by a Turing machine, and
generated a mathematical model of the neuron, in which collections of neurons acted as “logic
gates,” now known as the McCulloch‐Pitts neuron.
(6.) The Sonnenschein‐Mantel‐Debreu results were a significant stimulus for this development
(cf. Rizvi 1997).
(7.) See Davis (2003b, Chapter 5) for a discussion of the emergence of functionalism in postwar
neoclassical economics in the work of Kenneth Arrow, Paul Samuelson, and others.
(8.) Searle also created the distinction between strong AI and weak AI, in which the former
identifies the computer and mind, and the latter involves computational simulation of some
aspects of mind.
(9.) Leigh Tesfatsion recalls that at a 1996 UCLA workshop she, Robert Axtell, Charlotte Bruin,
and Axel Leijonhufvud “discussed naming the field ‘agent based economics.’ Consequently, this
is why I called the website that I developed in late 1996 the ‘agent‐based economics website.’
However, I soon discovered that many analytical microeconomists felt they were already doing
‘agent‐based economics’ simply by means of having a utility maximizing consumer agent! So I
changed the name of the website to the ‘agent based computational economics’ (ACE) website to
try to indicate that we were referring to something quite distinct from current mainstream
economics. This is the name I still use for the Web site
[http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm] today” (Testfatsion, personal communication, 5
May 2006).
(10.) Externalities constitute the exception.
(11.) “It is not enough that each player be fully aware of the rules of the game and the utility
functions of the players. Each player must also be aware of this fact, i.e., of the awareness of all
the players; moreover, each player must be aware that each player is aware that each player is
aware, and so on ad infinitum. In brief, the awareness of the description of the game by all
players must be a part of the description itself” (Aumann 1989, 473).

(12.) Drawing on game theory applications to the Cold War, Harsanyi's example distinguishes
American and Russian types whose causal factors pertain to their locations in the United States
and the Soviet Union.
(13.) These are labeled semiconditional payoff functions.
(14.) I say “intention,” because it may be argued that Harsanyi's assumption that individuals
know their own types inadvertently re‐introduces elements of the standard view (cf. Davis
2003a).
(15.) An analogous but slightly different argument can be applied to the classical sequential‐
move or extensive form game (cf. Ross 2005, 201ff).
(16.) A parallel anthropological game theory investigation relies on non‐experimental field data
to examine strategic behavior across cultures (Henrich et al. 2004).
(17.) Thus, Vernon Smith's famous slogan is, “institutions matter” (Smith 1989).
(18.) Also, that migration occurred over repeated play, or that players did not select the higher
payoff institution on the first round(s) of the game, was interpreted to indicate that individuals
lack rational foresight.
(19.) See the paper by Don Ross in this volume for this point (Ross 2007).
(20.) According to most commentators, EGT falls outside the evolutionary economics research
program on account of its classical game theory origins, though it shares roots in biological
theory.
(21.) In contrast, the atomistic individual conception, which might be characterized as an
exclusively synchronic form of explanation, involves only a micro type conception.
(22.) There are of course also macrofoundations arguments for micro.
(23.) Thus, one ACE/complexity account of individual identity argues that individuals do
not/cannot retain self‐same identities across processes of change (Kirman & Teschl 2006).
(24.) Thus, some have defined the new approaches in economics in terms of tools rather than
content as, for example, with David Colander's modeling characterization (Colander 2000),
whereas dominant discourses appear to rather define themselves in terms of content (Robbins
1935 [1932]).

